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Case Comments
Contracts: Promissory Estoppel Applied to Bind Subcon-
tractor to His Subbid
Defendant subcontractor submitted a bid to plaintiff general
contractor who used it to compute his prime bid to the awarding
authorities. Several days after the opening of the prime bids
but more than a month before plaintiff received the award, de-
fendant attempted to withdraw the subbid because of substantial
errors he had discovered in it. More than a week later plaintiff
mailed to defendant a formal acceptance of the original subbid.
Defendant refused to perform at the original subbid price.
Plaintiff therefore employed two other firms to do the work at a
cost higher than the original subbid. Plaintiff brought suit for
damages caused by the defendant's refusal to perform. On the
basis of both local bidding practices and the customary bidding
conduct of the general contractor, the trial court found that the
subcontractor could expect the general contractor to rely on the
subbid and entered judgment for plaintiff on the ground of
promissory estoppel. On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the subcontractor is bound by his subbid
if he can reasonably expect that the contractor will rely on it
and the contractor reasonably does so to his detriment without
attempting to renegotiate1 the subcontract. Constructors Sup-
ply Co. v. Bostrum Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 71 (Minn.
1971).
The principle that an offer is revocable before acceptance un-
less supported by consideration is fundamental to the law of con-
tracts. 2 But to cover situations where the application of this rule
would cause injustice, modern contract theory has developed the
doctrine of promissory estoppel3 which makes certain promises
legally enforceable even though the element of bargained for con-
1. See text accompanying note 19 infra.
2. See RESTATEM E. oF CoNRAcTs §§ 35, 75 (1932).
3. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 90 (1932) states the doctrine as
follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promnisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.
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sideration is lacking.4 The doctrine is a logical extension of
equitable estoppel, which estops certain defenses when one has
made a misrepresentation as to past or present fact. Promissory
estoppel estops the denial of consideration by one who has made
a promise on the ground that he has misrepresented as to the
future.! The principle has for the most part been applied to
gratuitous or donative promises such as the charitable donation,0
the promise to convey land,7 the gratuitous bailment8 and the
waiver of an existing right.9 In some jurisdictions promissory
estoppel is deemed inappropriate for promises made in commer-
cial bargaining, an area where conventional offer-acceptance
principles have historically reigned.10 Other jurisdictions, how-
ever, have freely invoked it, for example, in negotiation for the
financing of construction" and in franchising.12
There is a split of authority as to whether the concept is ap-
plicable to construction subbidding,13 each line of authority re-
4. See generally Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969).
5. See generally Henderson, supra note 4, at 376-77.
6. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania's Trustees v. Cox' Ex'rs,
277 Pa. 512, 121 A. 314 (1923). See also 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 198
(rev. ed. 1963).
7. See, e.g., Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930);
Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882). See also Pound, Consideration
in Equity, 13 ILL. L. REV. 667, 672 (1919).
8. See, e.g., Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414
(1923). See generally Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or
Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951).
9. In the Minnesota case of Albachten v. Bradley, 212 Minn. 359,
3 N.W.2d 783 (1942), the court applied promissory estoppel to the stat-
ute of limitations defense, estopping the debtor when he promised to
settle the claim and induced the creditor to forbear suit.
10. See Henderson, supra note 4, at 353.
11. See, e.g., Lehrer v. McCloskey Homes, Inc., 245 F.2d 11 (3d Cir.
1957); Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 428 P.2d 524 (1967).
12. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123
(1958); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267
(1965).
13. For decisions upholding its validity in this area see N. Litterio
& Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Reynolds
v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583, 374 S.W.2d 818 (1964); Norcross
v. Winters, 209 Cal. App. 2d 207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 821 (D. Ct. App. 1962);
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); E.A.
Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216
A.2d 246 (1966); Northwestern Eng'r Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10
N.W.2d 879 (1943). For decisions refusing to apply it in this area, see
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933);
Southeastern Sales & Serv. Co. v. T.T. Watson, Inc., 172 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
App. 1965); Milone & Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc., 49 Wash.
2d 363, 301 P.2d 759 (1956).
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lying on either of two opposing major cases. Drennan v. Star
Paving Co.,14 in applying promissory estoppel to construction
subbidding, directly opposes the holding of the earlier case of
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc.'8 In Baird, Judge
Learned Hand reasoned that the parties to the bilateral nego-
tiation did not bargain for the general contractor's use of the sub-
bid in making his prime bid. Thus, because there was no con-
sideration, there could be no binding contract at the time of use
and the subcontractor could withdraw his offer before the con-
tractor explicitly accepted. 16 Judge Hand rejected promissory
estoppel as a solution because, in his view, the subcontractor ex-
pected an acceptance of his subbid by the general contractor af-
ter the award of the prime contract.1" Judge Traynor, in Dren-
nan, agreed that neither party envisioned use of the subbid as
acceptance and that there could thus be no binding contract.
But the subcontractor could nevertheless expect that the con-
tractor would be forced to use the low subbid in computing his
own bid. The court found that this expectation justified the im-
plication of a promise by the subcontractor, subsidiary to his
subbid offer, not to revoke the offer until the general contrac-
tor had been allowed a reasonable time in which to accept. As
a first step the court had to marshall support for the finding of
this implied subsidiary promise not to revoke the offer. Since
subbidding negotiations are bilateral, the Restatement of Con-
tracts' Section 45 is not directly pertinent because it evidences
the law only with respect to protection of the unilateral offeree
who has relied by partially performing.' s The protection is there
obtained by implying a promise by the unilateral offeror which
is subsidiary to the offer. The Drennan court, however, reasoned
that the bilateral offeree could be protected using the same im-
plied promise concept. Since the support for the implied promise
in the unilateral context is the consideration found in part per-
formance by the offeree, the second step for the court was to
find something in lieu of such consideration to support the im-
plied promise in the bilateral context. The court based its reason-
ing that bargained for consideration is not necessary for enforce-
ment in the bilateral context on language in comment b to Re-
statement of Contracts, Section 45. The comment states that
14. 51 CaL. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
15. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
16. Id. at 346.
17. Id.
18. See generally 1 A. CoRaIN, supra note 6, at § 63.
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mere "justifiable reliance" by the offeree may serve as a reason
for binding the offeror to the subsidiary promise not to revoke.10
Thus detrimental reliance, though not bargained for, replaces
conventional consideraton as a justification for enforcement
in the bilateral context.
The Drennan court held that the general contractor must act
reasonably; he cannot delay acceptance in the hope of getting a
better offer, nor can he reopen bargaining with the low sub-
bidder.20 It is probable that in making this limitation the court
was conscious of the practices of "bid shopping" and "bid chop-
ping." In bid shopping the general contractor contacts other sub-
contractors before or after he submits the prime bid and encour-
ages them to undercut the low subbid. In bid chopping subcon-
tractors take the initiative in trying to undercut the low subbid.
In the instant case the Minnesota Supreme Court followed
Drennan in applying promissory estoppel to the bargain context
of construction subbidding.2 1 The court held that the general
contractor's refusal to accept the low subbid before award of the
contract but after the prime bidding did not impair his rights in
invoking the estoppel.22 However, the court expressly limited
the holding to situations with no shopping or chopping conduct.2 1
But the court did not make clear, with respect to chopping, the
19. Comment b states that "merely acting in justifiable reliance
on an offer may in some cases serve as a sufficient reason for making
a promise binding (see § 90)." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45,
comment b, at 54 (1932).
20. The opinion states that "lilt bears noting that a general con-
tractor is not free to delay acceptance after he has been awarded the
general contract in the hope of getting a better price. Nor can he re-
open bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a
continuing right to accept the original offer." 51 Cal. 2d at 415,
333 P.2d at 760.
21. Promissory estoppel has been accepted in Minnesota as a logi-
cal extension of equitable estoppel. See Albachten v. Bradley, 212 Minn.
359, 3 N.W.2d 783 (1942) (promisor estopped from pleading the statute
of limitations). It is well recognized in charitable donation cases.
See Horan v. Keane, 164 Minn. 57, 214 N.W. 546 (1925); Albert Lea
College v. Brown's Estate, 88 Minn. 524, 93 N.W. 672 (1903). Cf.
Rochester Civic Theater, Inc. v. Ramsay, 368 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1966).
Prior to the instant case, however, no Minnesota decision had upheld
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as applied to the commercial bar-
gaining of construction subbidding. But the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, interpreting Minnesota law, had applied it to a franchise prom-
ise in Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388
(8th Cir. 1968).
22. Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrum Sheet Metal Works, Inc.,
190 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Minn. 1971).
23. Id. at 77.
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extent of participation by the general contractor in such further
negotiation which would prevent invocation of the estoppel.
The application of the promissory estoppel rule in construc-
tion subbidding is justified by the need to protect the contractor's
reliance on the low subbid. To establish the amount of his prime
bid, he must rely on a compilation of such subbids which are
usually submitted shortly before he submits the prime bid.2 4
After the prime bids are submitted and opened the contractor
cannot change his bid. As in the instant case, the general con-
tractor's reliance is most acute when he must submit a bid bond
with the prime bid which will be forfeited if he is awarded the
contract and does not perforn 25 If the subcontractor has made
a mistake and refuses to perform, or if he attempts to substi-
tute a higher subbid quotation later, the general contractor must
take the loss to avoid forfeiture of the bid bond, a possible dam-
age suit by the awarding authority or a reputation for submitting
unreliable bids. Enforcement of the subbid is therefore justified
by the principle that the subcontractor, having made a mistake,
should bear the loss, or even not having made a mistake, should
not be able to force the relying contractor to a higher subcon-
tract price.26 Indeed, the Minnesota court, in referring to local
practices, found that subcontractors themselves expect the gen-
eral contractor to rely and that they expect to be bound to their
subbids.2
7
24. Subcontractors submit bids as late as possible apparently to
prevent the contractor from bid shopping. See Note, Another Look at
Construction Bidding and Contracts at Formation, 53 VA. L. REv. 1720,
1738 (1967).
25. 190 N.W.2d at 75-76. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court
stressed the bid bond as a component of reliance, the requirements for
application of the estoppel are generally satisfied if the contractor
merely incorporates the subbid in his prime bid, even if there is no
required bid bond. See Note, supra note 24, at 1722-23.
26. However if the mistake is so large as to be noticeable to the
contractor, he cannot invoke the estoppel since any reliance on the
subbid is unreasonable. See Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15
Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (1964).
27. 190 N.W.2d at 73. The trial court stated that the subcon-
tractors in the area agree to be bound to their subbids, and the su-
preme court apparently based its finding on this assertion. Brief for
Appellant at Appendix 11. The trial judge did not make the assertion
as a finding of fact, and the only evidence in the record which appears to
support this assertion is testimony by the plaintiff contractor. Record
at 46, 177-78. See generally Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study
of Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHL L. Rnv.
237, 267-68 (1952); Note, supra note 24, at 1734.
Although subcontractors generally expect contractors to rely, few
make "firm offers" which expressly keep the offer open. Because of the
1972]
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Some limitation in the application of the promissory estoppel
rule is required to afford the low subbidder needed protection. 8
If the general contractor gets the prime contract, he is not re-
quired to subcontract with the subbidders on whom he has re-
lied in the absence of a statutory basis for such an obligation.2 9
Thus unless he is somehow restrained, the general contractor is
free to actively pursue a better subcontract price and yet bind the
low subbidder if the quest is to no avail. It is even possible in
such a situation for the subcontractor to force the low subbidder
to go lower by threatening to subcontract with another sub-
contractor for a lower price he has found while shopping.
Subcontractors lacking legal protection have made attempts
to prevent such conduct. Some low subbidders try to demand
acceptance conditional on award at the time of subbid submis-
sion, generally without success, due to lack of sufficient bargain-
ing power.30 The primary reason for general contractors' refusal
of such a demand appears to be their superior bargaining position,
especially after prime bidding.3 ' Other reasons, however, also
exist for such refusal. A general contractor will not submit to
such a demand because he does not have the time to check sub-
bids just before he submits the prime bid and is fearful of being
bound to a subcontractor's mistaken specification or error in
price computation.32 Also, if the low subbid is from a subcon-
haste before prime bidding, most subbids are oral. If the subcon-
tractor made his subbid irrevocable, in a signed writing, and if it could
be resolved that he is a "merchant to buy or sell goods," UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205 would apply to bind him. It states:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is
not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated
or if no time is stated, for a reasonable time, but in no event
may such a period of irrevocability exceed three months; but
any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree
must be separately signed by the offeror.
See E.A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super.
69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966). See also Comment, UCC § 2-205 and Promis-
sory Estoppel, 18 ME. L. REv. 297 (1966); Comment, Promissory Estop-
pel as Applicable to Termination of an Offer Not Irrevocable Upon Its
Face, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 489 (1966).
28. There is a great deal of evidence in the record of the instant
case that local contractors shop and entertain shops. Record at 116,
144-48, 158, 200-01.
29. See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Gunderson Bros.
Eng'r Corp., 305 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962); Milone & Tucci, Inc. v. Bona
Fide Builders, Inc., 49 Wash. 363, 301 P.2d 759 (1956). Some states do
have such a statutory basis. See, e.g., discussion of California statute,
infra note 41.
30. See Note, supra note 24, at 1745-47.
31. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
32. See Note, supra note 24, at 1745-47.
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tractor with whom the general contractor is unfamiliar, he may
reluctantly rely on it, but will want to reserve a decision to ac-
cept until after he has had time to verify the subcontractor's re-
liability.33 Subcontractors have also tried to restrict contrac-
tors by forming bid depositories. Where a bid depository has
been set up, all subbids are made public, and the general contrac-
tors make known the accepted subbids before submitting the
prime bid. There are various penalties for attempting to with-
draw or change a subbid after submission, and other sanctions
force members to continually use the depository and boycott con-
tractors who do not use it. Unfortunately, such sanctions have
caused some courts to hold the depository to be a restraint of
competition in violation of the Sherman Act.3 4  An additional
problem with the depository is that it cannot control the conduct
of local contractors and subcontractors who are not members. If
these problems can be minimized, the public disclosure which
makes the depository effective, particularly in the knowledge it
brings to others in the industry concerning conduct of a contrac-
tor, seems to be the most promising type of protection the sub-
contractor can obtain.
Regardless of whether or not effective extra-legal protection
is available to the local subcontractor, courts recognize his plight
and deny relief to the contraqtor who seeks to invoke the estop-
pel after actively renegotiating for a better contract.35 But such
a limitation is insufficient protection for the subcontractor when
it is simply stated that no shopping or chopping will be allowed.
Since the court looks to the contractor's conduct to determine
whether, promissory estoppel should be invoked, the contractor
can avoid the limitation simply by delaying after the opening
of prime bids. Without shopping or actively participating in
chopping during the delay, he can passively entertain the chops
of other subcontractors a short time after he knows he is the
low bidder or likely to get the contract. This behavior is no less
harmful to the low subbidder than if the contractor actively re-
negotiates. It is almost impossible for a subcontractor to estab-
33. Id.
34. Christiansen v. Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository, 230 F.
Supp. 186 (D. Utah 1964); Oakland-Alameda Cty. Builders' Exch. v.
F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., 4 Cal. 3d 354, 482 P.2d 226, 93 Cal. Rptr. 602
(1971). See also Schueller, Bid Depositories, 58 Mic. L. REv. 497
(1960); Note, Once Around the Flag Pole: Construction Bidding and
Contracts at Formation, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 816, 825-26 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d
757 (1958) (dictum); R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194,
247 P.2d 817 (1952).
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lish in court that such conduct has occurred, or even to convince
a court that such conduct should prevent estoppel invoca-
tion. The Minnesota court ignored such passive conduct in the
instant case, where the contractor admitted that he entertained
lower subbids as a general practice,3 6 and where there was evi-
dence, albeit disputed, of bid chopping on other subprojects of
the job.3 7 The effectiveness of the limitation is further impaired
when a court accepts the argument that since there is no guaran-
tee that the low prime bidder will get the award the contractor
should not have to accept until after the award when the award
is not made immediately after prime bidding. This argument is
without merit in most situations since the contractor can make
an acceptance conditioned on his receiving the award. In some
situations this argument is justified since the contractor must
often consolidate overlapping subbids and decide on alternative
specifications or prices 38 suggested in the subbids. However, the
contractor must iron out many of these complications anyway
in order to make a tenable prime bid, and thus should be in a
position after prime bidding to decide whether or not to accept
without taking on too much additional consolidation work.
Moreover, in localities where bid depositories are operative, he
must do all the consolidation in order to accept the subbids
before prime bidding, so the burden should not be considered
onerous where no depository constrains the contractor.3" Fur-
thermore, many of the subprojects have no such complications in
the first place. But in spite of the weakness in the uncertainty
argument, the Minnesota court was unfortunately persuaded by
it and allowed the delay of more than one week.40  Thus the
36. There was testimony by the general contractor in the instant
case that he entertained lower subbids. For example, he stated: "We
do not negotiate. We cannot speak for other people. If, as an example
XYZ Company, for some reason or other, wants to reduce their price,
we are going to entertain it." Record at 112-14.
37. Id. at 210-13. Also, one of the subcontractors who testified
described his own subbid reduction as a bid chop. Id. at 148-49.
38. Subcontractors give an alternative to the contractor in several
ways. For instance, a subcontractor might specify in his subbid that
he can do the work only with #1 pipe instead of the #2 pipe desig-
nated in the contractor's specifications. Also, on a part of the subproject
for which the contractor has not made detailed specifications, a sub-
contractor might specify that he will do the job either with #1 pipe for
one price or with #2 pipe for another. Such suggested variations prob-
ably occur more often and with greater complexity on large projects,
increasing the time and effort that must be expended in choosing sub-
bids and refining the prime bid.
39. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
40. 190 N.W.2d at 76. For another court which accepted the argu-
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court's allowance of the delay, and thus the possibility of enter-
taining chops all but destroys any protection the limitation might
give to the subcontractor.
In the absence of statutory protection41 or other means of
ameliorating the subcontractor's position,42 a refinement of the
limitation is needed to prevent abuse by the contractor. Yet the
refinement must not destroy the protection of the contractor's
reliance or curtail the extra time he needs after the opening of
prime bids to check the reliability of subbids. The needed extra
time could not be provided if use of the subbid constituted ac-
ceptance, a rule suggested by some authorities43 but rejected by
both the Drennan and Baird opinions.4 4  The objectives can be
met instead by requiring the contractor who seeks to invoke the
rule to conditionally accept the low subbid offer a short but rea-
sonable time after prime bid opening. Such a requirement de-
nies the contractor the extra time to passively entertain chops.
The reasonable time given the contractor to check a subbid
would depend on the size and complexity of the job, the number
of subcontractors on whose subbids he relied, and his familiarity
with their past work and reputation. In situations where the
particular subproject is so complex that the contractor could
ment, see Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'r Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 95,
92 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1971).
41. California has a statute that requires the contractor to reveal
the subcontractors whose subbids he used in compiling the prime bid.
It reads, in part:
The Legislature finds that the practices of bid shopping and bid
peddling in connection with the construction, alteration, and
repair of public improvements... deprive the public of the full
benefits of fair competition among prime contractors and sub-
contratcors, and lead to insolvencies, loss of wages to employees,
and other evils.
No prime contractor whose bid is accepted shall: (a) Sub-
stitute any person as subcontractor in place of the subcontractor
listed in the original bid ....
CAl GOV'T CODE §§ 4101, 4107 (West 1966).
In Southern California Acoustics Co., Inc. v. C.U. Holder, Inc.,
71 Cal. 2d. 719, 456 P.2d 975, 79 Cal. Rptr 319 (1969), it was held that
such bid listing obligates the contractor to subcontract with the listed
subbidders. The court found that the statutory purpose was to protect
both the public and subcontractors from unfair shopping and chopping.
42. One suggested solution has been that subcontractors contract
separately with the awarding authority. This is unrealistic since the
large number of subprojects would be an unwieldy burden for the
prime contract architect, and it could lead to padded subbids by un-
scrupulous subcontractors that would be difficult to detect. See Note,
supra note 34, at 828.
43. Id. at 829-34.
44. See text accompanying notes 16 & 18 supra.
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not fully consolidate and choose alternative specifications and
prices before prime bidding, and it is burdensome for him to un-
dertake the task after prime bidding when he is uncertain of
award, such time might extend beyond the time of award. But
such complication should not excuse the contractor from condi-
tionally accepting the subbids on simpler portions of the project,
nor should he be excused if, because of extensive consolidation
work prior to prime bidding, only minimal work would be re-
quired to completely consolidate prior to award. If he does not
respond within a reasonable time, either he should not be able to
invoke the estoppel, or at least there should be a presumption
of shopping or entertaining chops which would shift the burden
of proof on the issue to the contractor.
Jury Instructions: Upon Request Court Must Instruct
that Compensatory Damages Are Not Subject to Federal
Tax
Plaintiff, a longshoreman, was injured while loading de-
fendant's ship. Alleging the cause of the injury to be the ves-
sel's unseaworthy condition, plaintiff brought an action before a
jury in the federal district court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 1 Defendant argued unsuccessfully that the jury
be instructed that any damages awarded plaintiff would not be
subject to federal income tax and that the jury therefore should
not add or subtract from the award on account of federal taxes.
2
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and defendant ap-
pealed, alleging that failure to grant the requested instruction
constituted reversible error. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed but ruled that in the future, federal district courts of
that circuit must instruct the jury upon request that compensa-
tory damages awarded in personal injury actions are not sub-
ject to federal tax.3 Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
443 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1971).
Traditionally, "The primary aim in measuring damages [has
been] compensation, and this contemplates that the damages for
a tort should place the injured person as nearly as possible in
the condition he would have occupied if the wrong had not oc-
1. 312 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
2. The following is the text of the requested charge:
I charge you, as a matter of law, that any award made to the
plaintiff in this case, if any is made, is not income to the plain-
tiff within the meaning of the federal income tax law. Should
you find that plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages, then
you are to follow the instructions already given to you by this
court in measuring those damages, and in no event should you
either add or subtract from that award on account of federal
income taxes.
443 F.2d 1245, 1248-49.
3. The defendant also contended on appeal that slips of paper
containing information regarding the jury's methods in computing the
$270,982 award to the plaintiff to which the trial judge accidently
became privy, were grounds for finding that the jury had failed to ad-
here to the trial court's instructions. Defendant also argued that plain-
tiffs assertion that defendant would have recourse against a third
party, which the jury was told to disregard, constituted prejudicial
error. In addition, remarks of counsel during summation and in closing
argument, as well as the size of the award, were assigned as error by
the plaintiff. The court, however, found no prejudicial error and
found the award not excessive.
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curred . . . . 4 Adherence to this theory of tort damages re-
quires an award equal to past and future loss of net after-tax
earnings since personal injury awards generally are not subject
to taxation. 5 Nevertheless, United States courts traditionally
have held that personal injury awards should approximate the
plaintiff's present and future gross income. 6 Until recently, this
departure from the compensation theory of damages was not
challenged by defense lawyers in either state or federal courts.
Since 1944, however, numerous defendants have undertaken
to show that net earnings should be the true measure of damages
and have attempted to introduce evidence of the amount that
plaintiff's gross earnings would have been taxed had he been
able to work. The courts have based their consistent refusal to
admit such evidence7 on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) determination of future tax liability would be too conjec-
tural; s (2) personal injury litigation would become "trials by
tax experts"9 and thereby confuse the jury'0 if the net income
theory were employed; (3) the congressional intent of the tax
law is to give plaintiffs a tax benefit;" (4) the tax consequences
are matters between the plaintiff and the taxing authority1 2 and
4. C.T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 560 (1935).
5. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 104 (1967).
MINN. STAT. § 290.08(5) (1969) (amended 1967).
6. The two earliest cases in which the question arose are Stokes v.
United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944), and Crecelius v. Gamble-
Skogmo, 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944). The question was ad-
dressed directly in Stokes, while in Crecelius, a juror, during the course
of deliberation, asked whether or not any award received by plaintiff
would be subject to income tax. In neither instance was the jury in-
structed on the non-taxability of damage awards. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.
2d 1396 (1959).
The English rule, however, is to the contrary. In British Trans.
Comm. v. Gourley, 3 All E.R. 796, 802 (1955) it was stated that "to
ignore the tax element at the present day would be to act in a manner
which is out of touch with reality."
7. But see O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959)
(a Federal Tort Claims Act case); Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144
Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957); Meehan v. Central R.R. Co., 181 F. Supp.
594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (wrongful death actions).
8. See Stokes v. U.S., 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Hall v. Chicago
& Northwestern Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Briggs v.
Chicago Great Western Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957).
9. Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrong-
ful Death is Tax Exempt; Should We Tell the Jury?, 14 DEPAUL L. REv.
320, 323 (1965).
10. McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co.,
282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960).
11. See Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125
N.E.2d 77 (1955).
12. Id.
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should not enter into the plaintiff-defendant relationship.
As a result of the general disapproval of the net earnings
rule by the courts, it soon became apparent to defense attorneys
that attempts to introduce tax evidence at trial were predes-
tined to failure. Therefore they resorted to jury instructions as
the means to inform jurists that compensatory damages for past
and future lost earnings were not subject to federal income taxes.
The requested instructions were cautionary in nature, their pur-
pose being merely to inform the jury of the fact of non-taxation
and to caution it not to consider taxes at all in determining the
plaintiff's award. Initially, such efforts went unrewarded.' 3
Then, in Dempsey v. Thompson,1 4 an FELA case, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court ruled that in future actions a cautionary
instruction must be given to the effect that damages awarded for
lost earnings are not subject to state or federal taxation. The
court reasoned that "[p] resent economic conditions are such that
most citizens, most jurors, are not only conscious of, but acutely
sensitive to, the impact of income taxes."' Until Domeracki,
however, no Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had approved such
an instruction.'1
The Domeracki court, in requiring a cautionary instruction
upon request in future cases, primarily relied on the "absence of
complications that an instruction would engender."' 7  The in-
struction approved by the court simply cautioned the jury to
neither add nor subtract from the award on account of federal
income taxes. Such an instruction does simplify the jury's task
by removing taxes from consideration in arriving at damages.' s
Nevertheless, the decision is only a weak and inadequate im-
provement on pre-Domeracki law since (1) the cautionary instruc-
tion does not result in an award based on the traditional notions
of compensation; and (2) the prospective application of the de-
cision to the exclusion of the instant plaintiff results in a depri-
vation of the defendant's efforts without any sound countervail-
ing reasons.
The use of a cautionary instruction to meet the problems
raised by the non-taxability of compensatory damages has been
13. See note 6 supra.
14. 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
15. Id. at 346, 251 S.W.2d at 45.
16. Domeracki v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1252
(1971).
17. Id. at 1251.
18. See Morris, Should Juries in Personal Injury Cases be In-
structed that Plaintiff's Recoveries Are Not Income Within the Meaning
of the Federal Tax Law?, 3 DEFENSE L.J. 3, 11 (1958).
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regarded as a "compromise" between the alternatives of intro-
ducing evidence of plaintiff's tax liability and complete disregard
of the matter. The argument is that with a cautionary instruc-
tion the objections to the former alternative are met in that
the jury would not be confused by the introduction of tax evi-
dence and yet the instruction avoids the defects of the latter
possibility in preventing mistaken considerations of tax liability
in determining the damage award. 19 The view that such a pro-
cedure combines "the best of both worlds," however, is fallacious.
While a cautionary instruction does serve to prevent a "dou-
ble windfall" to the plaintiff, the basis used by the jury to de-
termine past and future lost income is still the plaintiff's gross
income. That is, the plaintiff is given the amount he would
have been paid by his employer before taxes since the jury is
told to disregard any taxes that may have been deducted from
the gross earnings. 20 Such a situation seems preferable to the
pre-Domeracki approach which ran the risk of a "double wind-
fall" in giving the plaintiff his taxes twice by awarding the
gross earnings and then tacking on the amount of tax the jury
mistakenly believed would be deducted by the Internal Revenue
Service. 21 Still, the uncomfortable fact remains that the plain-
tiff under Domeracki is getting more than his due from the de-
fendant. 22
To prevent overcompensation of accident victims, compro-
mises must be discarded. Instead juries must be required to
19. Note, Damages-The Role of Income Tax Exemption in Ac-
tions for Personal Injuries, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 108, 110 (1953).
20. See Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards,
19 OHio ST. L.J. 212, 231 (1958).
21. The "double windfall" possibility may be hypothetically illus-
trated as follows: If plaintiff's lost earnings were $10,000 (assuming
the entire amount to be taxable income) his tax liability under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would be $2,100 if he filed a separate
return. Therefore, his net earnings would be only $7,900. If the jury
started with gross income, already a "single windfall" over the actual
net damages, and then tacked on the amount of the tax-erroneously
believing the award to be taxable-the total award would be $12,100.
Therefore, the plaintiff would, in effect, be getting his tax windfall
twice. The cautionary instruction, if heeded by the jury, removes the
possibility that the additional $2,100 would be added to the award.
Still, it does not prohibit the plaintiff from receiving more than $2,000
in excess of what he would have been entitled to had the accident not
occurred because the jury's compensation equals gross, rather than net
earnings.
22. In fact, the defendant may be harmed by the Domeracki
instruction since it forecloses the possibility of a jury independently ar-
riving at an approximation of the net income figure.
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grant awards equal only to lost past and future net income. To
arrive at that figure, evidence must be admitted respecting the
plaintiff's past and anticipated future tax liability. Although the
introduction of such tax information has been attacked on sev-
eral grounds, thoughtful examination of these arguments reveals
that the admission of such evidence would create no insurmount-
able problems.
Numerous judges and commentators have contended that
any determination of plaintiff's future tax liability would be
simply too conjectural.23 Contingencies such as plaintiff's marital
status, size of family and the fact that any interest earned on
the amount awarded is taxable all have been mentioned as fac-
tors complicating the computation.2 4 Yet such a determination
is certainly no more conjectural than estimation of future earn-
ings or the evaluation of pain and suffering-tasks with which
the jury copes regularly in personal injury litigation.23  More
bluntly expressed:
As long as our system stays wedded to the single lump sum
recovery, our courts simply have to speculate about the uncer-
tainties of the future. With anything as sure as "death and
taxes," the courts are avoiding their responsibilities when they
decline to make the best guess they can, once all the reasonably
available evidence has been brought before them.2 6
The fear also has been expressed that personal injury liti-
gation would become a "trial by tax experts" which would serve
only to confuse the jury.-27 This argument overlooks the fact
that expert witnesses are used constructively in several areas
of litigation. Medical doctors, psychiatrists, expert tradesmen
and others28 are called upon to testify in pertinent situations, and
there seems to be no reason to believe that the tax expert would
"confuse" the jury to any greater degree. Indeed, if the Ameri-
can public is as "tax conscious" as the Domeracki court believes,
23. See, e.g., Briggs v. Chicago & Great Western Ry., 248 Minn.
418, 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957).
24. McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co.,
282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960).
25. Note, Personal Injury Awards: Should Tax Exempt Status be
Ignored?, 7 ARxz. L. Ruv. 272, 273 (1966).
26. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, LAw OF TORTS 1327 (1956).
27. ,Burns, supra note 9.
28. Expert testimony has been defined as "evidence of persons who
are skilled in some art, science, profession or business, which skill or
knowledge is not common to their fellow-man, and which has come to
such experts by reason of special study and experience in such art,
science, profession or business." Black Starr Coal Co. v. Reeder, 278
Ky. 532, 534, 128 S.W.2d 905, 906 (1939).
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the jury should have little trouble comprehending expert testi-
mony on the subject.
In refusing to admit tax evidence, the courts also have ar-
gued that allowing juries to consider the plaintiff's tax status
would constitute an abandonment of a Congressional intent to
give the injured plaintiff a tax saving.29 This contention is in-
correct. The provision exempting compensatory damages did
not appear until the Revenue Act of 1918. It was included not to
benefit injured parties but rather because it was considered
doubtful that tort damages were income within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment. 30
Finally, it has been alleged that fixing tax liability is a mat-
ter between the plaintiff and the taxing authority and of no
concern to the defendant. 31 This rationale 32 is founded on the
idea that Congress' decision not to tax these awards should af-
fect only the plaintiff and not inure to the benefit of the defend-
ant wrongdoer. 33 However, this justification begs the question
in assuming the inevitability of a gross income award windfall
and is in no way responsive to the issue at hand-the proper
measure of compensation.
The Domeracki opinion therefore offers only a limited im-
provement upon prior law, stopping short of the optimal ruling.
The court's reluctance to depart from precedent was revealed
further in its decision to apply the holding prospectively to the
exclusion of the defendant. That decision was based upon two
considerations. First, the court felt that its decision would not
reasonably have been foreseen by the trial court.34 Everf if true,
it is difficult to ascribe a great deal of importance to this factor,
especially when it is weighed against the fact that the plaintiff
29. Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 5 fl1. 2d 135. 125
N.E.2d 77 (1955).
30. Nordstrom, supra note 20, at 222-23.
31. Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.
2d 77 (1955). See also Nordstrom, supra note 20, at 222-23.
32. It has been suggested that, analytically, the fact that personal
injury awards are not subject to federal income taxation is the con-
verse of the collateral source rule in that the benefit received from the
third party is in the form of a withheld expense rather than an actual
contribution of money or services. See generally Morris, supra note 18.
The collateral source rule has been defined as follows: "The judi-
cial refusal to credit to the benefit of the wrongdoer money or services
received in reparation of the injury caused which emanate from sources
other than the wrongdoer." Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in
the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. Rsv. 669, 670 (1962).
33. Nordstrom, supra note 20, at 223.
34. 443 F.2d 1245, 1252 (3d Cir. 1971).
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may have been overcompensated to the defendant's detriment
as a result of the decision. This latter factor should be the over-
riding consideration and yet was totally ignored by the Circuit
Court. Second, the court found no evidence that the amount of
the award had been affected by any mistaken notions regarding
taxes.3 5 But there is no way of obtaining such evidence because
of the secrecy of jury deliberations. Especially under the
facts of this case,36 the Court should have used a Molitor ap-
proach in ruling prospectively 37 rather than risk the injustice of
permitting the plaintiff to receive an undue amount at defend-
ant's expense.
The Domeracli case is noteworthy because it is an attempt
to come closer to what has been an elusive goal-properly com-
pensating an individual for losses actually suffered due to an-
other's breach of the duty of due care.38 But in the final analysis,
this plaintiff, like those before him, may have received a double
windfall. All future plaintiffs in the Third Circuit will continue
to receive awards based on gross income, an amount greater
than that which would have been received were it not for the
accident. As long as that situation continues to inure, the "cardi-
nal principle" of compensatory damages will be subverted.
35. Id.
36. See note 4supra.
37. See Molitor v. Kaneland Comm. Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959), in which the court's decision is applied to the parties
to the actual case before it, but the decision has otherwise a purely
prospective application.
38. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, LAW OF ToRTs 1299 (1956).
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